Lost Innocence and the Moral Foundation of Law by Day, Kate Nace
LOST INNOCENCE AND THE MORAL
FOUNDATION OF LAW
KATE NACE DAY*
[A~nd I walk on in there and smash a myth.
GLORIA ANZALDUA1
INTRODUCTION
Once upon a time, on the day before the first day that truly mat-
tered,2 there was a garden filled with innocence. Within that gar-
den and its innocence, there were first beings, beings of color and
sex. When these first beings met, they recognized each other as
human and recognized within themselves the moral obligations of
being human.3 Human moral reciprocity arose in the garden
blessed with innocence, color, and sex.
And then, on the first day that truly mattered,4 innocence was
lost. Human knowledge of good and evil entered the garden and
the human beings were expelled and banished, not because of
their color or sex, but rather, and always, for their knowledge of
good and evil. The human beings could always remember the
garden and innocence and moral reciprocity. -5
* Professor of Law, Suffolk University Law School;J.D. 1980, University of California
School of Law at Berkeley (Boalt Hall). I wish to express my thanks to Dean Paul Sugarman,
Suffolk University Law School, for his valued support of this project. I would also like to
thank my colleagues, Professor Stephen Hicks, Sylvia Peck, and Associate Dean Russell
Murphy, for their comments and suggestions on earlier drafts.
1. GLORIA ANzALuA, O.K Momma, Who the Hell am I?: an Interview with Luisah Teish, in
THIS BRIDGE CALLED MY BACK 231 (Cherrie Moraga & Gloria Anzaldua eds., 1981).
2. CATHARINE MAcKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 40 (1987). In her discussion of"the
first day that mattered," MacKinnon uses the phrase to refer to the creation of patriarchy and
male dominance in society.
3. I wish to express special thanks to ProfessorJohn E. Coons, University of California
School of Law at Berkeley (Boalt Hall), for his invaluable encouragement and support, as well
as for his insights into the story of the first human encounter.John E. Coons, Who Believes in
Equality? (Mar. 1991) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author). See MAmx TwIN, The
Diary of Adam and Eve, in THE COMPLETE SHORT STORIES OF MARK TWAIN 272, 282 (Charles
Neider ed., 1957) (providing a fictional account of that first meeting and Eve's recognition of
Adam's and her own humanity).
4. MAcKINNON, supra note 2.
5. Regardless of one's religious tradition or personal philosophy, everyone is raised
with myths and metaphors that teach us how to be good human beings. The garden of the
Judeo.Christian tradition is the story that the author was given, but it is not the only one. I do
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My own memory of the garden is rooted in the memories of a
childhood game.6 On warm afternoons, on the way home from
Abe's comer market in the Flatbush section of Brooklyn, I would
dash out into the middle of Avenue L, sit down cross-legged on the
warm street and transform the flat, grey macadam into a garden of
wildflowers. I would sit there in silence happily admiring the palette
of colors in my garden until the honking from some rounded, rum-
bling automobile would send me dashing for the curb, the tips of my
fingers trailing in the flowers as I fled. Wherever that child went,
she walked within this power to transform. Wherever she was, there
was the garden.
Before the child was eight, however, the world pressed in; human
beings who were once distant and opaque became concrete and an-
gry. Thus, I learned that in order to preserve the power to trans-
form, I must place the garden deep within me. From deep within
the garden, I wrote poetry and stories and filmscripts; I held my son
when he was born; I held my brother when he died. Sometimes, on
very good days, I teach and write about law from within the garden.
Other days, I struggle hard to transform the light from the garden
"into language, then into idea, then into more tangible action." 7
The story of the garden may be termed myth or metaphor. My
memory of the garden may be termed feminist narrative" or feminist
method.9 Regardless, both the story and one's memory of the gar-
den instruct us of a world across the horizon, a world both before
and beyond the world that transformed color and sex into racism
not discuss other stories due to a lack of confidence to speak of them, not a lack of respect or
regard. See AUDRE LORDE, An Open Letter to Mary Daly, in SxSTER OUTSIDER 67 (1984) (asking
Mary Daly why she failed to discuss African myths and metaphors in a positive way and only
referred to them with regard to genital mutilation).
6. See bell hooks, Theory as Liberatory Practice, 4 YALEJ.L. & FEMINISM 1, 11 (1991):
Our search leads us back to where it all began, to that moment when an individual
woman or child, who may have thought she was all alone, began feminist uprising,
began to name her practice, indeed began to formulate theory from lived experience.
7. AuDRE LORDE, Poetry is Not a Luxury, in SISTER OUTSIDER 37 (1984).
8. For a discussion of feminist narrative, see generally Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call
of Stories, 79 CAt. L. REv. 971,982 (1991) (examining feminist narrative scholarship - the use
of stories and personal experiences to discuss legal issues affecting women - as a distinctive
form of critical legal discourse, and discussing responses and objections to this form of
scholarship).
9. For a description of feminist method, see CATHAINE MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMI-
NIST THEORY OF THE STATE 83-105 (1989) (depicting feminist method as consdousness-rais-
ing). MacKinnon explains,
The point of the process was not so much that hitherto-undisclosed facts were un-
earthed or that denied perceptions were corroborated or even that reality was tested,
although all these happened. It was not only that silence was broken and that speech
occurred. The point was, and is, that this process moved the reference point for
truth and thereby the definition of reality as such.
Id at 87.
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and misogyny. This essay is about restoring the light from the gar-
den and transforming that light into language and principles that, in
turn, will transform the law affecting color, sex, and the exclusion
produced by racism and misogyny.
The history of American constitutional law began when the fram-
ers of the United States Constitution gathered and fashioned law to
embody their human moral obligations. From the beginning, color
and sex were used to exclude human beings from the moral commu-
nity.10 As the late United States Supreme Court Justice Thurgood
Marshall wrote upon the Bicentennial of the Constitution, the fram-
ers' intent was to exclude both slaves and women from "We the
People.""u
"[S]everal amendments, a civil war, and momentous social trans-
formation" were required to remedy these historical exclusions and
bring these outsiders even formally within the system of constitu-
tional government.1 2 As Justice Marshall concluded:
The men who gathered in Philadelphia in 1787 could not have
envisioned these changes. They could not have imagined, nor
would they have accepted, that the document they were drafting
10. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684-85 (1973):
There can be no doubt that our Nation has had a long and unfortunate history of
sex discrimination. Traditionally, such discrimination was rationalized by an attitude
of "romantic paternalism" which, in practical effect, put women, not on a pedestal,
but in a cage....
As a result of notions such as these, our statute books gradually became laden with
gross, stereotyped distinctions between sexes and, indeed, throughout much of the
19th century the position of women in our society was, in many respects, comparable
to that of blacks under the pre-Civil War slave codes. Neither slaves nor women
could hold office, serve on juries, or bring suits in their own names, and married
women traditionally were denied the legal capacity to hold or convey property or to
serve as legal guardians of their own children.
Id.; see also infra notes 42-44 and accompanying text (discussing the laws of slavery, segrega-
tion, domesticity and dominance).
11. Thurgood Marshall, Reflections on the Bicentennial of the United States Constitution, 101
HA v. L. Rav. 1, 2 (1987) (asserting that the Bicentennial Celebration should not forget the
stain of racism and sexism that flawed the original document; recalling the tragic conse-
quences of this exclusion; and terming the anniversary a "commemoration," not a celebra-
tion.); see also Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr., I Have A Dream, Address at the Lincoln
Memorial, Washington, D.C. (Aug. 28, 1963), quoted in DONALD G. NIEMAN, PRoIrisEs TO
KEEP: AFRICAN-AMERIcANs AND THE CONSTITIIrrONAL ORDER, 1776 TO THE PRESENT i (1991):
When the architects of our republic wrote the Declaration of Independence and the
Constitution, they were signing a promissory note to which every American was to
fall heir. This note was a promise that all men [sic] would be guaranteed the unalien-
able rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.
It is obvious today that America has defaulted on this promissory note so far as
citizens of color are concerned. Instead of honoring this obligation, America has
given the Negro people a bad check; a check which has come back marked "insuffi-
cient funds." But we refuse to believe that the bank ofjustice is bankrupt.... So we
have come to cash this check - which will give us riches of freedom and the security
ofjustice.
12. Marshall, supra note 11, at 2.
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would one day be construed by a Supreme Court to which had
been appointed a woman and a descendant of an African slave. 13
Blacks and women are now, at least formally, included within the
American constitutional system and the moral community. 14
Despite this formal inclusion, we continue to live a constant strug-
gle with the lies and myths that were necessary to turn color and sex
against human beings and turn human beings out of the moral com-
munity.15 Law has failed to redress the lingering and profound ef-
fects and implications of this historical exclusion, in part, because
law has employed the flawed moral principles that sanctioned
exclusion.
Some might argue that this makes morality irrelevant, that power
is the better lens through which to view the history of exclusion and
the work of inclusion. I look through the lens of morality because I
cannot look at the world without reference to good and evil; because
of the moral confusion surrounding issues of inclusion, such as hate
speech and affirmative action, pornography and abortion; and, most
importantly, because there are moral principles available to law that
will not perpetuate exclusion. 16
I. THE GARDEN: GOOD, EvIL, AND THE Loss OF INNOCENCE
A good place to begin is Eden.17 The story of Adam and Eve is a
tale of good and evil, of shame and the loss of innocence. When Eve
eats the fruit from the tree of knowledge of good and evil, when she
"succumbs to temptation and Adam joins in disobedience,"8 they
acquire the knowledge of good and evil and grasp that they are na-
ked. With this enlightenment, they lose their innocence and experi-
13. Marshall, supra note 11, at 5.
14. See supra text accompanying note 12. But see Patricia Williams, Legal Storytelling The
Obliging Shelk'An InformalEssay on FormalEqual Opportunity, 87 MICH. L. Rav. 2128, 2142 (1989)
(arguing that the formal eradication of racism and sexism has failed to eradicate them in the
actual, everyday lives of real people).
15. See, e.g., Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1872) (BradleyJ., concurring) (alleg-
ing that "the civil law, as well as nature herself, has always recognized a wide difference in the
respective spheres and destinies of man and woman"). Justice Bradley went on to assert,
"Man is, or should be, woman's protector and defender. The natural and proper timidity and
delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil
life." Id See generally Kate Nace Day, The Moral Confusion of Affirmative Action Jurisprudence or
When Will WeLearn to Bear the Shame of Guilt?, 16 VT. L REV. 777, 785 (1992) (contending that
in political systems committed to equality, the exclusion of certain groups of people from the
moral community required a justification that in some way blamed the excluded for their
exclusion).
16. See generally infra notes 20-29 and accompanying text.
17. For the original story of Adam and Eve in the Garden of Eden, see THE BIBLE,
Genesis 2:4-3:24.
18. HERBERT MORRIS, GUILT AND INNOCENCE 140 (1976).
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ence shame before one another.1 9
The light from the garden reveals shame and the loss of inno-
cence. Shame is often confused or merged with guilt. Shame, how-
ever, is a distinct moral feeling that is stirred not by wrongdoing, as
is guilt, but by the failure to live up to a moral ideal.20 Theologian
Dietrich Bonhoeffer offered one of the most eloquent definitions of
shame:
Shame is man's ineffaceable recollection of his estrangement from
the origin; it is grief for this estrangement, and the powerless
longing to return to unity with the origin. Man is ashamed be-
cause he has lost something which is essential to his original char-
acter, to himself as a whole... 21
Shame implies a positive attachment that is threatened by the failure
to live up to some moral ideal. Shame, then, is relational, the conse-
quence of a failure to be human as one aspires to being human. In
shame, one's own human self is exposed: Adam and Eve see they
are naked and cover themselves.
In guilt, Adam and Eve might atone for their wrongdoing. In
shame, on the other hand, they must transcend the shame by achiev-
ing the moral ideal. The difficulty of the garden is that the moral
ideal we must aspire to is the very thing that was lost in the garden:
innocence.
Moral philosopher Herbert Morris wrote about the loss of inno-
cence. He argued that innocence is lost of an instant, much as a
liability to shame is acquired, because of an insight into the nature
of human beings: "The objects of the knowledge embodied in lost
innocence are human beings."- 2 In coming to know about human
beings, we come to know of the presence in the world of good and
evil. In fact, Morris argued that the loss of innocence necessarily
involves the painful experience of evil.23
Evil, as Morris defined it, is
anything for which human beings are believed responsible that in
some way is destructive of what is of relatively great value. [Evil]
19. I d
20. I have adopted Gerhart Piers's psychoanalytic formulation of the distinction between
shame and guilt:
Whereas guilt is generated whenever a boundary ... is touched or transgressed,
shame occurs when a goal... is not being reached. Guilt anxiety accompanies trans-
gression, shame, failure.
GERHART PIERS & MILTON B. SINGER, SHAIE AND GUILT 24 (1971). See Day, supra note 15, at
809-16 (explicating the distinction between shame and guilt).
21. DiEmRicH BONHOEr'ER, Emcs 20 (Eberhard Bethge ed. & Neville Horton Smith
trans., The MacMillan Co. 6th ed. 1963) (1955).
22. MoRRIs, supra note 18, at 147.
23. MoRius, supra note 18, at 156-57.
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includes ... failing to promote what is of value, preventing its
promotion and actually destroying what is of value. What would
then account for some conduct being wrong would be the evil that
it causes.2 4
Shame, then, is a moral feeling prompted by the loss of innocence
and can be understood as an experience of evil. Evil, the loss of
innocence, and shame involve the painful recognition in ourselves
of this capacity, this something we do not love but hate, and the
recognition in others of the same capacity in relation to us that we
hate and do not love.25 The end result is that
[1loss of innocence gives us a knowledge, then, not of what is right
and wrong or the set of dispositions to act and feel in certain ways
connected with this knowledge, but a knowledge of evil and the
set of dispositions to act and feel that are connected with this
knowledge.26
With the loss of innocence, we become conscious of our vulnerabili-
ties. We guard ourselves against the pain of the evil we believe we
may do or may be done us, and, like Adam and Eve, in shame, we
cover ourselves.
When Adam and Eve lost their innocence to the experience of
evil, they also acquired knowledge of the good. Knowledge of the
good would ensure that innocence was always remembered and
could be counted upon, as shame requires, to transcend evil. Morris
made a similar point:
To appreciate that there is evil in the world, to hold no illusions
about it, to be serious about it, to have experienced its many man-
ifestations, to have seen as well as evil what allows for its being
overcome, to see all that makes for the good and to give it due
weight - these seem among the essential components of moral
wisdom.
2 7
Thus, moral wisdom involves not accepting the legacy of exile from
the garden as written, but finding the way to transcend evil.
Law could, of course, embody the light from the garden and the
understanding of how lost innocence can help us transcend the evils
of racism and misogyny.28 The story of Eden continues, however.
Immediately after the fall, after Adam and Eve are expelled from the
24. MORRIS, supra note 18, at 153.
25. MORRIS, supra note 18, at 157.
26. MORRIS, supra note 18, at 154.
27. MORRIS, supra note 18, at 161.
28. See, eg., NxE ANsupra note 11, at vi ("In the state ofnature, men [sic] are in fact born
equal; but they cannot remain so. Society deprives them of equality, and they only became
equal again because of the laws." (quoting CHARLES DE SECONDAT, BARON DE MONTES0IEU,
THE SPIRrr OF THE LAWs (1748))).
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garden, "comes the story ofjealousy and rivalry, of rage and sin -
the murder of Abel by Cain. Here emphasis is not on opening eyes,
exposure, and hiding, but on sin[,] ... on controlling the aggressive
drive.., and on being overwhelmed by it, on murder, blood, and
retaliation." 29
The moral foundation of this part of the story is not shame and
the loss of innocence, but, rather, guilt and the transgression of
prohibitions. In guilt, innocence does not speak to some inherent
human quality that might be lost in an instant, but rather simply to
one's not being responsible for a particular wrongdoing. Shame
and the loss of innocence are about relational aspects of being
human which prompt transformation of the self to transcend evil.
Guilt, on the other hand, is about punishment or, at its very best,
compensation for a wrong. Guilt is not only the language of the
story of Cain and Abel. Interestingly, guilt is also the moral lan-
guage and principle most often associated with law.
II. THE GARDEN, THE MORALITY OF ASPIRATION, AND LAW
The relationship between the garden and law can be drawn with
the language and principles of morality. While many legal philoso-
phers address the relationship between morality and law,30 Lon
Fuller spoke directly to the task of "writing beyond the ending"' 31 of
29. LUON WURMSER, THE MASK OF SHAME 58 (1981). For the original story of Cain and
Abel, sons of Adam and Eve, see THE BIBLE, Genesis 4:1-16.
30. See, e.g., JOHN RAWLs, A THEORY oFJUSTiCE (1971) (discussing moral principles, psy-
chology, reasons, sentiments, theory, worth of persons, association, authority, and principles
as a means of developing a theory of justice as fairness that is a sensible alternative to the
dassical utilitarian and intuitionist conceptions ofjustice). Rawls warns his readers that "[wle
should view a theory ofjustice as a guiding framework designed to focus our moral sensibili-
ties and to put before our intuitive capacities more limited and manageable questions for
judgment." Id. at 53. See STEPHEN MACEDO, LIBERAL VIRTUES: CITIZENSHIP, VIRTUE, AND
COMMUNrry IN LIBERAL CONSTITUTIONALISM 40 (1991) (arguing that "[l]iberalism stands for
peace through toleration, law-bound liberty, and a rights-oriented conception ofjustice," and
that this concept of political virtue is not antithetical to liberal regimes); ROBERT NozicK,
ANARcHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974) (stating that a respect for individuals and property enti-
tlements makes wealth redistributing actions of the government illegitimate or immoral). But
Se MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (1982) (asserting that the
"unencumbered self" portrayed in the liberal theory byJohn Rawls is implausible and fails to
yield the protected rights and proper wealth distribution suggested by Rawls); Mar J.
Matsuda, LiberalJurisptrdence and Abstracted Visions of Human Nature: A Feminist Critique of Rawls'
Theory ofJustice, 16 N.M. L. REv. 613 (1986) (criticizing Rawls's theory ofjustice as making
false assumptions about human nature and suggesting equally feasible theories obtained from
feminist thought). See generally SIMON LEE, LAW AND MORALS: WAPNOCx, GiLLOCII AND BEYOND
(1986) (placing a great value on the religious perspective and arguing that by distinguishing
between predictions as to the consequences of legal action and moral values, academics will
be better able to frame issues and the processes of resolving dilemmas); MoRALtry AND THE
LAW (Robert M. Baird & Stuart E. Rosenbaum eds., 1988) (induding well-known essays ad-
dressing the enforcement of morals and the conflict between law and conscience).
81. RACHEL BLAU Du PLESSIS, WRITING BEYOND TilE ENDING: NARRATIVE STRATEGIES OF
TWENTIETH-CENTURY WOMEN WRrrERs (1985). Du Plessis uses the term "writing beyond the
19931
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our history of exclusion through law.3 2 Fuller presented his theory
on the relation between morality and law in a series of essays, two of
which are particularly pertinent: The Two Moralities33 and The Sub-
stantive Aims of Law.3 4 In The Two Moralities, Fuller examined the rela-
tionship between law and morality and argued that we are governed
by two moralities that bear directly on law: the morality of duty and
the morality of aspiration.3 5
The morality of duty provides the basic rules of an ordered
society:
It is the morality of the Old Testament and the Ten Command-
ments. It speaks in terms of "thou shalt not," and, less frequently,
of "thou shalt." It does not condemn men for failing to embrace
opportunities for the fullest realization of their powers. Instead, it
condemns them for failing to respect the basic requirements of
social living.36
The morality of duty, then, is the morality of guilt and sin, the mo-
rality of the story of Cain and Abel.
The morality of aspiration, on the other hand, is more closely
linked to lost innocence. It is "the morality of the Good Life, of
excellence, of the fullest realization of human powers."1
37 It is most
plainly exemplified in Greek philosophy:
In a morality of aspiration there may be overtones of a notion ap-
proaching that of duty.. But these overtones are usually muted, as
they are in Plato and Aristotle. Those thinkers recognized, of
course, that a man might fail to realize his fullest capabilities. As a
citizen or as an official, he might be found wanting. But in such a
case he was condemned for failure, not for being recreant to duty;
for shortcoming, not for wrongdoing.38
Thus, the morality of aspiration involves conceptions of human
good, not wrongdoing, and shame, not guilt. Moralists of aspiration
find particular actions unworthy of beings with human capacities.
Moralists of duty, on the other hand, ask whether an action is "so
harmful that we ought to consider that there is a general moral duty,
ending" to mean the ways in which writers refuse to follow the patterns of conventional narra-
tives, especially those that require either death or domesticity for their female characters. For
a discussion of the ways certain contemporary black women writers "write beyond the end-
ing," see BLACK-EYED SUSANS/MIDNIGHT BIRDS: STORIES BY AND ABOUT BLACK WOMEN (Mary
Helen Washington ed., 1990).
32. LON FULLER, THE MoRALrry OF LAW (1964).
33. LoN FULLER, The Two Moralities, in THE MORALITY OF LAW 3 (1964).
34. LON FULLER, The Substantive Aims of Law, in THE MORArr? OF LAW 152 (1964).
35. FULLER, supra note 33, at 5.
36. FULLER, supra note 33, at 6.
37. FULLER, supra note 33, at 5.
38. FULLER, supra note 33, at 5.
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incumbent on all, to refrain from engaging in it."' ' 9
Fuller differentiated between these two moralities when defining
their relationship to law. He noted that the morality of duty finds a
natural role in law, and reasoned that both legal and moral duties
are justified by principles of reciprocity: "In this broad sense there
is a notion of reciprocity implicit in the very notion of duty - at least
in the case of every duty that runs toward society or toward another
responsible human being."40 The principles of reciprocity, and the
methods employed to decide whether an activity is so harmful that
there is a general moral duty to refrain from it, are the same princi-
ples and methods used to decide whether there is a legal duty to
refrain from it.
However, the morality of aspiration - at least at first look - finds
no such natural role in law. Fuller explained that "there is no way
by which the law can compel a man to live up to the excellences of
which he is capable. For workable standards of judgment, the law
must turn to its blood cousin, the morality of duty."4 1 Thus, even if
we are capable of moral wisdom, capable of transcending evil, the
law cannot compel us to do so.
When we examine the history of exclusion in American law in
light of the two moralities, we see the moral failure of law. In fact,
because of the absence of aspiration, society used moral principles
to develop law in the service of evil. The laws of slavery4 2 and seg-
regation 43 served racism; the laws of dominance and domesticity 4
39. FULLER, supra note 33, at 7.
40. FULLER, supra note 33, at 21.
41. FULLER, supra note 33, at 9.
42. See generally NIEMAN, supra note 11 (tracing the ambivalent relationship between
African-Americans and the Constitution from the birth of the Republic to current battles over
school segregation, voting rights, and affirmative action, and showing how the current de-
bates often ignore the history of law and race in America); PAUL FINKE A , SLAVERY IN THE
COUaTROOM (1985) (presenting an annotated bibliography of predominately American cases
pertaining to slavery); A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM,JR., IN THE MATrER OF COLOR: RACE AND THE
AMERICAN LEGAL PRocEss (1978) (setting forth how colonial American courts, legislatures,
and public servants vacillated in their treatment of blacks).
43. See generally C. Vann Woodward, THE STRANGE CAREER oF JIM CROW (3d ed. 1974)
(providing the history and effect of American laws concerning race).
44. In many ways, it is impossible to separate discussion of the dominance theory from
the legal and social domestication of women. In an early discussion of the law of dominance,
John Stuart Mill recognized the relationship between domestication and dominance:
Men do not want solely the obedience of women, they want their sentiments. All
men, except the most brutish, desire to have, in the women most nearly connected to
them, not a forced slave but a willing one; not a slave merely, but a favourite. They
have therefore put everything in practice to enslave their minds. The masters of
slaves rely, for maintaining obedience, on fear, either of themselves, or religious
fears. The masters of women wanted more than simple obedience, and they turned
the whole force of education to effect their purpose ....
JOHN STUART MILL, The Subjection of Women (1869), reprinted in THREE EssAys BYJOHN STUART
MILL 443-44 (The World's Classics ed. 1912). Mill concluded,
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served sexism. Thus, the morality of duty in the law of exclusion
sanctioned the evils of racism and misogyny.
Fuller addressed this point in his essay, The Substantive Aims of
Law,45 in which he argued that the morality of aspiration finds a nat-
ural role in law when confronting the problem of defining the moral
community. This situation is exemplified by our history of exclu-
sion. He posed the question:
Who are embraced in the moral community, the community
within which men [sic] owe duties to one another and can mean-
ingfully share their aspirations? In plain straightforward modem
jargon, the question is, Who shall count as a member of the in-
group?
4 6
The morality of duty cannot provide rational principles for defining
who should be included or excluded within the moral community.
The morality of duty is the moral code of those already included
within the moral community, the morality of the "in-group."
The morality of aspiration, on the other hand, requires that we
aspire to enlarge the moral community at every opportunity.4
7
Fuller argued that the morality of aspiration provides the moral
principle that "imperatively condemn[s] drawing a line between
[people], and denying to one group access to the essentials on
which a satisfactory and dignified life can be built .... ,,48 The mo-
rality of aspiration provides the impetus to mandate inclusion:
The morality of aspiration is after all a morality of human aspira-
tion. It cannot refuse the human quality to human beings without
repudiating itself.... [W]e are above all else human beings. If we
have to qualify our answer [to the question, "If we are for our-
selves alone, what are we?"] by adding some biological tag line to
our own title, then we deny the human quality to ourselves in an
effort to justify denying it to others.
49
The imperative of the morality of aspiration is not to exclude.
Rather, it is to include all human beings within the moral
community.
The social domination of women thus stands out as an isolated fact in modem insti-
tutions; a solitary breach of what has become fundamental law; a single relic of an old
world of thought and practice exploded in everything else, but retained in the one
thing of most universal interest...
Id. at 449-50. In contemporary feminist discourse, Catharine MacKinnon developed the
"dominance theory" that focuses on ending male legal and social dominance over women
rather than on achieving some vision of equality between the sexes. MAcKiNNoN, FEMINISM
UNMODIFIED, supra note 2.
45. FULLER, supra note 34, at 152.
46. FULLER, supra note 34, at 181.
47. FULLER, supra note 34, at 183.
48. FULLER, supra note 34, at 183.
49. FULLER, supra note 34, at 183-84.
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To my knowledge, Fuller never returned to his theory of the two
moralities and law. Therefore, we do not know his thoughts on the
further implications of his theory or the substance of the principles
of the morality of aspiration. Fuller did, however, offer a clue on
how to proceed. He concluded that we can derive from the morality
of aspiration a substantive proposition of natural law: "[T]he princi-
ple that supports and infuses all human aspiration [is] ... the objec-
tive of maintaining communication with our fellows." °5 0 By seeking
open channels of communication,
the morality of aspiration offers more than good counsel and the
challenge of excellence. It here speaks with the imperious voice
we are accustomed to hear from the morality of duty. And if men
[sic] will listen, that voice, unlike that of the morality of duty, can
be heard across the boundaries and through the barriers that now
separate men [sic] from one another.5 '
Thus, the imperative of the morality of aspiration imposes on all a
moral duty to listen.
III. VoIcEs FROM THE GARDEN AND "WRITING BEYOND THE
ENDING"
5 2
Years ago, when I began a study of racism and constitutional law,
I listened to voices: the voices of Sojourner Truth,53 Zora Neale
Hurston,54 and W.E.B. Du Bois,5 5 the voices of Toni Morrison's
50. FULLER, supra note 34, at 185.
51. FULLER, supra note 34, at 186.
52. See supra note 31.
53. See infra note 85.
54. See, e.g., ZoRA NEALE HURsToN, THEIR EYES WERE WATCHING GOD (Harper & Row
1990) (1937) (relating the story ofJanie Crawford, a young black woman living in the rural
South, and her search for self-expression and fulfillment); ZoRA NEALS HURSTON, DUST
TRAcxs ON A ROAD,; A AUTrOBIOGRAPHY (U. Ill. Press 1984) (1970) (describing the author's
life growing up in an all-black town in Florida, her college experiences, her travels and re-
search, and her views on racism and segregation); ZoRA NEALE HURSTON, MOSES, MAN OF THE
MOUNTAIN (U. Ill. Press 1984) (1939) (using the Biblical story of Moses and the release of the
Jews from Egypt as an allegory for the state of black America and subjugation by whites);
ZoRA NEALE HURSTON, MULES & MEN (Ind. U. Press 1978) (1935) (recounting folk tales,
poems and stories of rural southern blacks); ZoRA N.LE HURSTON, SERAPH ON THE SUWVANEE
(AMS Press 1974) (1948) (telling the story of Arvay, a young white woman living in Florida
after the Reconstruction, and her life and quest to find herself).
55. See, e.g., W.E.B. Du Bois, THE GIFr OF BLACK FOLK; THE NEGROES IN THE MAKING OF
AMERICA (AMS Press 1971) (1924) (describing the important role that African-Americans
have played in the history and formation of American society and culture); W.E.B. Du Bois,
BLACK FOLK THEN & Now (Kraus-Thomson Org. 1975) (1939) (examining the history and
culture of black people in Africa, Egypt, the United States, and Europe); W.E.B. Du BoIs, THE
SOULS OF BLACK FOLK; ESSAYS AND SKETCHES (Buccaneer Books 1976) (1903) (using short
essays and stories to challenge white hatred and racism toward blacks, and to discuss "the
problem of the color line"); W.E.B. Du Bois, THE SUPPRESSION OF THE AFRICAN SLAvE-TRADE
TO THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 1638-1870 (Russell & Russell 1965) (1898) (recounting a
history of slave trade in the United States, from its English origins through the Civil War).
For the story of W.E.B. Du Bois's life, see his three autobiographies: DARKWATER VOICES
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Sethe56 and Ralph Ellison's invisible man.5 7 And from these voices,
I learned new language and new principles. In an earlier article, I
argued that shame provides moral principles to support affirmative
action measures as moral action aimed to transform racism and ex-
clusion 58 Thus, I attempted to provide new language and new
moral principles to guide issues of inclusion.
Today, legal scholarship is filled with the voices from the garden
telling stories of the experience of exclusion. As Richard Delgado
has noted, "[Elveryone has been writing stories these days."5 9 Fem-
inists,60 as well as critical race theorists, 61 use narrative, and narra-
FROM WITHIN THE VEIL (AMS Press 1969) (1920); DUSK OF DAWN; AN ESSAY TOWARD AN AU-
TOBIOGRAPHY OF A RACE CONCEPT (Schocken Books 1968) (1940); AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF W.E.B.
Du Bois: A SoLILOqUY ON VIEWING My LIFE FROM THE LAST DECADE OF ITS FIRST CENTURY
(1968).
56. TONI MORRISON, BELOVED (1987) (describing the life of Sethe, a black woman who
escaped from slavery, and the challenges she faced in rural Ohio after the Civil War).
57. RALPH ELuSON, INVISIBLE MAN (Vintage Books 1989) (1947) (relating the story of a
black man made invisible by the white people who refused to see him or recognize his
equality).
58. Day, supra note 15.
59. Richard Delgado, Storytellingfor Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH.
L. REV. 2411, 2411 (1989).
60. See, e.g., Marie Ashe, ZigZag Stitching and the Seamless Web: Thoughts on "Reproduction"
and the Law, 13 NOVA L. REV. 355 (1989) (using narrative to discuss medical terminology and
legal discourse concerning women's reproductive experiences); Robin L. West, The inference
in Womben's Hedonic Lives: A Phenomenoogfcal Critique of Feminist Legal Theory, 8 Wisc. WOMEN'S
LJ. 81 (1987) (arguing that feminist legal theorists neglect the distinctiveness of women's
lives and the relevance to legal criticism of women's difference, and that expressing the au-
thor's contention via narrative is the only way to convey this feature of women's hedonic lives
and reflect the importance of narrative expression as a feminist method of moral argument);
Abrams, supra note 8 (discussing responses to feminist narrative scholarship); Angela Harris,
Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L REV. 581, 615 (1990) ("In order to
energize legal theory, we need to subvert it with narratives and stories, accounts of the partic-
ular, the different, and the hitherto silenced."); Patricia Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstruct-
ing Ideals from Deconstructed Rights, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 401 (1987) (using stories and
meditations to explore her life as an African- American woman);Judy Scales-Trent, Commonal-
ites: On Being Black and White, Different, and the Same, 2 YALEJ.L. & FEMINISM 305 (1990) (em-
ployingjournal entries and stories to combine two statuses in society: black and white);Joan
C. Williams, Dissolving the Sameness/Diference Debate: A Post Modem Path Beyond Essentialism in
Feminist and Critical Race Theory, 1991 DUKE LJ. 296 (examining the debates over sameness and
difference that have split feminists and African-Americans, and recognizing the value of
narrative).
61. The "Racial Critiques Debate" focuses in part on the role of narrative in legal theory.
See generally Randall L. Kennedy, Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, 102 HARv. L. REv. 1745
(1989) (examining the racial critique literature of Derrick Bell, Richard Delgado, and Mari
Matsuda that employs narrative, and evaluating some of the normative premises underlying
these authors' writings as they relate to white academics); Richard Delgado, When a Story isJust
a Story: Does Voice Really Matter, 76 VA. L. REV. 95 (1990) (responding to Randall Kennedy's
critique of Critical Race Theory, and explaining the difference between Kennedy's and the
author's works as a result of their different views regarding legal language and the nature of
racism); Scott Brewer, Choosing Sides in the Racial Critiques Debate, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1844
(1990) (focusing on various critiques of Randall Kennedy's commentary on Critical Race The-
ory and asking what might keep the various critics from realizing they have a common goal);
Miler S. Ball, The Legal Academy and Minority Scholars, 103 HaRv. L. REV. 1855 (1990) (defend-
ing the narrative works of Richard Delgado, Derrick Bell, and Mari Matsuda as taking respon-
sibility for the legal academy by creating change in what others view as scholarship); Robin D.
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tive itself has become an important and recurring theme in legal
scholarship. 62 When we listen to these voices in light of the garden
and the morality of aspiration, several implications are dear.
The first implication is that Fuller's basic theory of the two morali-
ties remains intact even after we invoke the imperative of aspiration
to formally include all human beings. This formal inclusion of his-
torically excluded groups has not made morality irrelevant. There
remains a distinction between moral duty and moral ideals:
[Tjhere is an invisible pointer that marks the dividing line where
the pressure of duty leaves off and the challenge of excellence be-
gins. The whole field of moral argument [will continue to be]
dominated by a great undeclared war over the location of this
pointer.65
Professor Catharine MacKinnon argues that power and not mo-
rality is the proper lens through which we must examine women's
lives.64 At one point, MacKinnon appears willing to grant some role
to morality:
Barnes, Race Consciousnes: The Thematic Content of Racial Distinctiveness in Critical Race Scholarship,
103 HAR'. L. REv. 1864 (1990) (arguing that Randall Kennedy confuses the rationale for
advocating the value of diversity in legal education and explaining how sensitivity to diversity
is developed without claiming a privileged status for the minority experience); Richard
Delgado, Mindset and Metaphor, 103 HAv. L. REv. 1872 (1990) (examining the differences in
Randall Kennedy's work and that of Critical Race Theorists and encouraging academics to
discuss the standards of argument and scholarship and the power of metaphors); Leslie G.
Espinoza, Masks and Other Disguises: Exposing Legal Academia, 103 HAiv. L. REV. 1878 (1990)
(claiming that Randall Kennedy's critique of Critical Race Theory fails because it assumes the
validity of the status quo and that the strength of Critical Race Theory is the way it allows
individuals to identify with the commonality of minority experien6e); Delgado, supra note 59
(explaining how storytelling creates a shared understanding among those groups who have
been marginalized from mainstream legal culture, and examining the use of stories in the
battle for racial reform which benefits all individuals); MariJ. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom:
Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L L. REV. 323 (1987) (discussing the
similar agendas and viewpoints of critical legal scholars and people of color and maintaining
that by listening to the narratives of people of color, critical scholars may better criticize the
law and define the elements ofjustice); Jane B. Brown, The Many Promises of Storytelling in Law,
23 RUTGE S LJ. 79 (1991) (reviewing DAVID R. P~A'E, NA.RRAT'r AND THE LEGAL DIscouRsm
A READER IN STORY LING AND THE LAW (1990)) (suggesting that the storytelling or narrative
movement expresses a concern about the law's ability to confront legal problems and asking
whether there exist too many perspectives encompassed by narrative and whether too many
assertions are being made on its behalf; Thomas Patrick Gannon &Jay A. Ziemer, Narrative
and the Legal Neighborhood, 25 IND. L. REv. 289 (1991) (reviewing DAVID R. PAPxE, NARRATIVE
AND THE LEGAL DISCOURSE: A RADER IN STORYTELLING AND THE Lmw (1990)) (declaring that
based on Papke's collection, narrative jurisprudence has onlyjust begun as a mode of legal
criticism and expression).
62. For an example of legal scholarship on the merits of feminist narratives, see Abrams,
supra note 8, at 971 (developing responses to criticisms of feminist narrative scholarship by
examining recent narrative works, which may lead to a better evaluation and understanding of
the narrative form). See generally supra notes 60, 61 and accompanying text.
63. FULLER, supra note 33, at 10.
64. James McCormick Mitchell Lecture, Feminist Discourse, Moral Values, and the Law - A
Conversation, 34 BUFF. L. REV. 11, 27-28 (1985) (transcribing an interactive discussion among
Ellen C. DuBois, Mary C. Dunlap, Carol J. Gilligan, Catharine A. MacKinnon, & Carrie J.
Menkel-Meadow).
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I think that women's silence.., goes deeper than the absence of
words; it is the absence of life, of the ability to live in security or
wholeness - hence, the inability to articulate or to express. This
prior absence does affect questions of morality.
6 5
Yet, then she makes it clear that power, not morality, is the basis for
her argument. She asserts that, if inequality stems from the subor-
dination of women, and not from inaccurate differentiations based
on sex, then "it is inappropriate to discuss the reality of treating
women as sub-human as a matter of good versus evil. Appropriate,
instead, is an argument and a discussion about empowerment, about
power."
6 6
I disagree. While power is not irrelevant, neither is morality. The
law of exclusion and its morality of duty did perpetuate evil. The
law of exclusion and its morality of duty, however, also have begun
to respond to the morality of aspiration and its imperative of inclu-
sion. I believe that this response was initiated as a moral response
to the evil of racism exposed in the Holocaust. For example, after
World War H, the United Nations began efforts to establish world-
wide consensus on human rights standards. 67 That was moral ac-
tion, action stirred by shame and the experience of evil.
Having heard the command of the imperative of aspiration, we
then must determine what is duty and what is aspiration for all
human beings, including those who once were formally excluded
from the principles of the morality of duty. The morality of duty
was like a garden wall, shutting out with the force of law and lies
human beings whose humanity could never be denied. This image
raises the questions whether women are "basically the same or basi-
cally different than men," 68 and whether "African-Americans are
65. Id. at 27.
66. Ido at 27-28.
67. In 1948, the United Nations adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
Dec. 10, 1948, G.A. Res. 217 A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948). Article 2 states in part:
Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, with-
out distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or
other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.
Jad Additionally, on March 7, 1966, the United Nations adopted the International Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 660 U.N.T.S. 195, reprinted in 5
I.L.M. 352. Article 2 states in part:
States Parties condemn racial discrimination and undertake to pursue by all appro-
priate means and without delay a policy of eliminating racial discrimination in all its
forms and promoting understanding among all races ...
lad
68. Joan Williams, supra note 60, at 296. See CAROL GiLUoAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE 7
(1982) (arguing that women are caring and strive to preserve ongoing relationships, while
men are autonomous and independent); Nancy Chodorow, Family Structure andFemininePerson-
ality, in WOMEN, CULTURE, AND Socrmry 43 (M. Rosaldo & L. Lamphere eds., 1974) (asserting
that because women raise children, for the most part, women's and men's personalities are
very different; and because women must be "other" than mother, men have to push their
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basically the same or basically different from European-Ameri-
cans." 69 This is the sameness/difference debate in both feminist
and critical race theory.
The morality of aspiration holds two implications here. First,
whether we are the same or different, we have a moral duty to listen
to and understand all experiences of exclusion. Professor Mar
Matsuda has eloquently argued this point throughout her
scholarship:
"Lift every voice," Paul Robeson sang, and I believe he meant
even lawyer-intellectuals who struggle with pen and paper. The
doctrine we construct, the better world we imagine, are acts of
solidarity with those who "have come over the way it]hat with
tears hath been watered." By listening to those who have paid the
greater price for their commitment to a just world, we can move
forward with them, closer to the place of peace.
70
The second implication of the morality of aspiration is pointed
out by Professor Joan Williams: that the sameness/difference de-
bate can divert attention away from issues of inclusion "into bitter
fights" among those arguing against exclusion. 7' Williams notes
that the sameness/difference arguments can be reformulated "to
capture their potential for transformation... "72 While she rejects
any essentialist notions of gender or race, her reformulation of the
debate acknowledges "the existence of shared patterns of experi-
ence (often linked to oppression). 7 3
In the language of the garden, the shared pattern of experience is
the shared experience of exclusion. A further implication, then, is
mothers away and devalue women); Wendy W. Williams, The Equality Crisis: Some Reflections on
Culture, Courts, and Feminism, 7 WoMEnN's RTs. L. REP. 175 (1982) (focusing on courts and the
legislative process where women seek change, and arguing that, for strategic purposes, wo-
men should be treated the same as men); Joan C. Williams, Deconstrucling Gender, 87 Mtcu. L.
Rnv. 797 (1989) (" 'Sameness' feminists usually have responded to the feminists of difference
by reiterating their basic insight that individual men and women can be very similar. While
true, this is not an adequate response to the basic insight of 'difference' feminists: that gender
exists, that men and women differ as groups.. ."); Christine A. Littleton, Equality and Feminist
Legal Theory, 48 U. Prrr. L. REv. 1043 (1987) (contending that equal or special treatment for
women uses a male norm, and arguing that a norm should be reconstructed so that what is
male is not the pattern); Richard A. Wasserstrom, Racism, S ism, and Preferential Treatment: An
Approach to the Topics, 24 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 581 (1977) (clarifying thinking about racism, sexism,
and affirmative action by using the perspectives of what is true of cultural or social realities,
and by what means the ideal may be achieved).
69. Joan Williams, supra note 60, at 296. See generally Wasserstrom, supra note 68 (dis-
cussing the practices of discrimination in American society, and the political and philosophical
differences between sexual and racial discrimination).
70. Matsuda, supra note 61, at 398-99 (citations omitted).
71. Joan Williams, supra note 60, at 298.
72. Joan Williams, supra note 60, at 299. Williams also discusses the changes needed in
the sameness and difference arguments to give them the potential to transform. Williams,
supra note 60, at 306-22.
73. Joan Williams, supra note 60, at 299.
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that, having heard the general command of the imperative of the
morality of aspiration, we face not only the inclusion of human be-
ings within the moral community, but also the inclusion of new
moral issues within the whole range of moral issues we face.
The experience of exclusion itself poses moral issues. For exam-
ple, one experience of exclusion is the experience of racism. Racism
always violated the morality of aspiration; racism was always evil.
Professor Patricia Williams writes of racism as the evil that shatters
innocence:
I remember with great clarity the moment I discovered that I was
"colored." I was three. I already knew that I was a "negro"; my
parents had told me to be proud of that. But "colored" was
something else; it was the totemic evil I had heard my little white
friends talking about for several weeks before I finally realized
that I was one of them. I still remember the crash of that devastat-
ing moment of union, the union of myjoyf-ul body and the terrible
power-life of that devouring symbol of negritude. I have spent
the rest of my life recovering from the degradation of being di-
vided against myself .... 74
Prior to formal inclusion, however, racism posed no moral issue
for the morality of duty and thus, in turn, no moral issue for law. In
fact, racism as an ideology was the required justification for using
the force of law to exclude. Now, the imperative of the morality of
aspiration has included Patricia Williams's experience of evil within
the debate about what is not just evil but what is morally wrong as
well. Here, we face moral issues of enormous complexity. Racist
speech is a fine example of the moral difficulty. The imperative of
the morality of aspiration requires that we listen. Racist speech,
however, when heard, may well be the experience of evil that shat-
ters innocence. 75
If we identify certain issues as issues of inclusion, we must address
those issues with the insight from the garden to determine what we
owe all human beings and what we aspire to give. Because this pro-
cess of inclusion occurs over time, embracing as it does a wide range
of moral issues, at each step the imperative of the morality of aspira-
tion must be heard again as a responsibility urged upon us by the
74. Patricia Williams, The Obliging Shei k An Informal Essay on Formal Equal Opportunity, 87
MiCH. L. REv. 2128, 2140 (1989).
75. Professors Richard Delgado and Mari Matsuda have argued that the law can reach
racist speech. See Richard Delgado, Words that Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets,
and Name-Calling, 17 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 133 (1982) (discussing the applicability of tort
actions to racial insults); MariJ. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considning the Victim 's
Story, 87 MicH. L. Rzv. 2320 (1989) (rejecting an absolutist First Amendment position to
defend racist speech and suggesting that public law should provide a cause of action for vic-
tims of such speech).
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call of our own humanity. At each step, the moral duty to include is
upon us. We must address all issues of inclusion from a developing
understanding of the relationship of evil and wrong, of moral duty
and moral ideal. For example, the current failure of affirmative ac-
tion jurisprudence is a failure to recognize such measures as moral
action designed to ensure inclusion.76
Many of the voices that speak and write about color and sex write
about evil. In these narratives and scholarship is the new language
that emerges from exclusion. There is the loss of innocence and the
pain of evil, the shame of being victim. In many, if not most, there is
also anger. For example, the voice of Audre Lorde vibrates with
anger:
Every Black woman in America lives her life somewhere along a
wide curve of ancient and unexpressed angers.
My Black woman's anger is a molten pond at the core of me, my
most fiercely guarded secret. I know how much of my life as a
powerful feeling woman is laced through with this net of rage. It
is an electric thread woven into every emotional tapestry upon
which I set the essentials of my life - a boiling hot spring likely to
erupt at any point, leaping out of my consciousness like a fire on
the landscape."
There is anger in the debate between cultural feminists and radical
feminists.78 There is anger in the debate between radical white fem-
inists and black feminists regarding racism and essentialism, 79 as is
seen in the recent exchange of articles between Angela Harris and
76. Day, supra note 15, at 835-54.
77. AUDRE LORDE, Eye to Eye: Black Women, Hatred, and Anger, in SISTER OUTSIDER 145
(1984).
78. See, e.g.,James McCormick Mitchell Lecture, supra note 64, at 73-76 (reprinting the
conversation between Catharine Macinnon and Carol Gilligan expressing different view-
points on the feminine voice and the positively valued feminine stereotype).
79. See Toni Cade Bambara, Foreward to THIS BRIDGE CALLED My BACK vi (Cherrie
Moraga & Gloria Anzaldua eds., 1981) (discussing the issue that lies at the center of the essen-
tialism/diversity debate within feministjurisprudence). Novelist Bambara articulates the issue
as follows:
[T]hough the initial motive of several siter/riters here may have been to protest,
complain or explain to white feminist would-be allies that there are other ties and
visions that bind, prior allegiances and priorities that supersede their invitation to
coalesce on their terms ("Assimilation within a solely western-european herstory is
not acceptable" - Lorde), the process of examining the would-be alliance awakens us
to new tasks ("We have a lot more to concentrate on beside the pathology of white
wimmin" - davenport).
Id, Audre Lorde also poignantly expresses her anger towards white feminists:
Within the community of women, racism is a reality force within my life as it is not
within yours. The white women with hoods on in Ohio handing out KKK literature
on the street may not like what you have to say, but they will shoot me on sight....
The oppression of women knows no ethnic nor racial boundaries, true, but that
does not mean it is identical within those boundaries. Nor do the reservoirs of our
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Catherine MacKinnon.8 0 There is anger between Randall Kennedy
and Richard Delgado in the Race Critiques Debate.8 '
This anger can forge the new language and the new principles for
addressing issues of inclusion. The anger also can generate evil. As
Morris put it:
[O]nce it enters our lives, [evil] has a generative power, and there
are forces at work toward deceiving oneself and others as to its
existence. All of this is nicely reflected in the tale by the serpent's
duping Eve and Eve blaming the serpent and Adam blaming
Eve.8 2
There is the moral duty upon all to listen; there is the moral ideal
that we will. The struggle is to remember innocence, to listen from
within that memory, and to transcend evil.
CONCLUSION
I close with the voices of two women who speak very differently,
but both from deep within the garden. ntozake shange describes
the struggle to remember innocence in her play, a photograph: lovers
in motion.83 In one scene, a photographer is showing a series of
slides to a woman dancer. The woman is upset by a photograph of a
violent scene, violence directed against women, and she reacts by
saying "there's more.., there's gotta be more,"8 4 and she begins to
dance. She speaks again as she dances:
i am space & winds
like a soft rain or a torrent of dust/ i can move
be free in time/ a moment is mine always
i am not like a flower at all
tho i can bloom & be a wisp of sunlight
ancient power know these boundaries. To deal with one without alluding to the
other is to distort our commonality as well as our difference.
For then beyond sisterhood, is still racism.
LORDE, supra note 5, at 97.
80. See Harris, supra note 60, at 585 (arguing against MacKinnon's use of essentialism,
which silences the voice of black women); Catharine A. MacKinnon, From Pracice to Theory, or
What is a White Woman An)way?, 4 YALEJ.L. & FEismtSM 13, 20 (1991) (taking the essentialist
position that" 'sex' is made up of the reality of experiences of all women, including African-
American women"); see also Trina Grillo & Stephanie M. Wildman, Obscuring the Importance of
Race: The Implication of Making Comparisons Between Racism and Sexism (Or other -isms), 1991 DvxE
LJ. 397 (noting that race is often omitted from discourse on sexism and even racism, which
tends to marginalize the relevance of race to these issues).
81. See Kennedy, supra note 61, at 1749 (stating that authors of color do not need to
establish a "racially distinctive brand of valuable scholarship"); Delgado, supra note 59 (chal-
lenging Kennedy's position and asserting the importance of the minority voice in legal schol-
arship). For further criticisms and comments regarding Kennedy's argument, see supra note
61.
82. MORRIS, supra note 18, at 160.
83. NTOZAXE SHANGE, a photograph: lovers in motion, in THREE PIECES 53 (1981).
84. Id. at 77.
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i'm a rustling of dead leaves
collections of ol women by the weddin
the legs of a cotton club queen
& so familiar with tears
alia this is mine/ so long as i breathe/ i'm gonna dance
for all of us/ everybody dead/ everybody busy
everybody too burdened to jump thru a nite
a hot & bluesyjump in the guts of ourselves
a dance is like a dream/ i can always remember
make it come again... i can make it come again8 5
We can always remember innocence; we can make it come again.
And the voice of Sojourner Truth gives us the heart to keep try-
ing, to believe we can "write beyond the ending":
86
If the first woman God ever made
was strong enough to turn the world
upside down, all alone




86. See supra note 31.
87. Sojourner Truth, Ain't 1A Woman, in BLAcK SIsTER 25 (E. Stetson ed., 1981).
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